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INTRODUCTION
Since China established its modern intellectual property system in
the early 1980s, policymakers, industries, commentators, and the media
have widely criticized its failure to adequately protect intellectual
property rights holders.1 From the repeated threats of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to impose unilateral trade sanctions in the
late 1980s and early 1990s,2 to China’s need for greater compliance
with international intellectual property standards in the run-up to its
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the early 2000s,3
to the ongoing disputes between China and the United States over the
former’s failure to adequately protect and enforce intellectual property
rights, mainstream media have been filled with clichéd stories about
China’s massive piracy and counterfeiting problems.4 In a recent report,
1 China introduced its trademark law in 1982, patent law in 1984, and copyright law in 1990.
For the Author’s earlier discussions of the Chinese intellectual property system, see generally
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the TwentyFirst Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners I]; Peter
K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO
China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners II]; Peter K. Yu,
Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle]; Peter K. Yu,
The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 209 (2011)
[hereinafter Yu, Middle Kingdom].
2 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 1, at 140–48 (discussing the United States’
use of unilateral sanctions to pressure China to reform its intellectual property system).
3 On December 11, 2001, China became the 143rd member of the WTO. See generally
Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1
(2003) (discussing the ramifications of China’s entry into the WTO).
4 For discussions of the recent WTO dispute between China and the United States on the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, see generally Panel Report, China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report]; Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS
Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046 (2011); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and
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the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) estimated that
“firms in the U.S. IP [intellectual property]–intensive economy that
conducted business in China in 2009 reported losses of approximately
$48.2 billion in sales, royalties, or license fees due to IPR [intellectual
property rights] infringement in China.”5
In recent years, however, the discourse on intellectual property
developments in China has slowly begun to change.6 Such a change is
the most notable in the patent area. Today, China is already among the
top five countries filing patent applications through the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT).7 In 2011, the number of PCT applications
increased by 33.4% to 16,406, earning China the fourth spot, behind
only the United States, Japan, and Germany.8 Among all the applicants,
ZTE Corporation (formerly Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment
Corporation) and Huawei Technologies, both Chinese firms, had the
largest and third largest number of PCT applications, respectively. By
contrast, Panasonic Corporation and Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha, both
Japanese firms, had only the second and fourth largest number of PCT
applications, respectively. U.S.-based Qualcomm placed the distant
sixth.
Earlier that year, the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO)
released a highly ambitious document outlining its National Patent
Development Strategy for 2011–2020.9 Included in the 2015 targets
were the following goals:
The annual quantity of applying for patents for inventions, utility
models and designs [in the country] will reach 2 million. China will
rank among the top two in the world in terms of the annual number
of patents for inventions granted to the domestic applicants, and the
quality of patents filed will further improve. The number of owning
patents every one million people and the number of overseas patent
applications filed by Chinese applicants will double. The proportion
of patent applications in industrial enterprises above designated size
will reach 8% and the quantity of owning patent rights will
Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 727 (2011).
5 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INV. NO. 332-519, USITC PUB. 4226, CHINA: EFFECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY xiv (2011).
6 See Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 525, 529–32 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Rise and Decline] (pointing out that China is at the
cusp of crossing over from a pirating nation to a country respectful of intellectual property rights).
7 All the figures from this paragraph are taken from Press Release, World Intellectual Prop.
Org., International Patent Filings Set New Record in 2011 (Mar. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2012/article_0001.html.
8 The estimated figures for the United States, Japan, and Germany were 48,596, 38,888, and
18,568, respectively. Id.
9 STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE [SIPO], NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY (2011–2020) (2011), translated at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/
business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY].
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significantly rise. . . . The patent transaction services will be
established in major cities of China with annual patent transaction
amounts reaching 100 billion yuan. . . . The patent examiner[s] will
reach 9,000. . . . The talents in the patent service industry will be
greater and the professional categories will be more complete, with
certified patent agents reaching 10,000.10

In the past few years, SIPO has also been actively developing
professional ties with leading patent offices from around the world. As
early as 2007, SIPO officials met with their counterparts from the
European Patent Office, the Japanese Patent Office, the Korean
Intellectual Property Office, and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) to discuss ways to “improv[e] the
efficiency of their examination systems and to harmonize their office
systems.”11 These so-called “IP5” discussions, which remain ongoing,
further strengthen SIPO’s status as “a player in the top tier of patent
offices that will dominate the emerging system of global patent
administration.”12
In view of these major developments in the patent area, it is high
time we rethink the accuracy and suitability of the traditional discourse
on intellectual property developments in China. To help achieve this
feat, this Article focuses on five key questions that I have been
repeatedly asked in presentations or conferences exploring recent
intellectual property developments in China. As the answers will
suggest, the future of the Chinese intellectual property system is rather
complex. This future reflects neither a rosy picture of China’s “great
leap forward” in the intellectual property arena nor a continuously
gloomy picture of pirates and counterfeiters. Instead, the picture is
dualistic and highly dynamic. It includes both yin and yang—the yin of
continued massive piracy and counterfeiting and the yang of China’s
rise as a patent power.
I. QUESTION 1: HOW IS THE QUALITY OF CHINESE PATENTS?
When The New York Times interviewed former USPTO director
David Kappos about SIPO’s National Patent Development Strategy, he
described the 2015 target numbers as “mind-blowing.”13 Although
SIPO’s strategy provided many different data points, media and
commentators thus far have focused considerably on the SIPO’s
projection that China’s patent applications will reach two million per
10
11

Id. at 4–5.
PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND
THEIR CLIENTS 236 (2010).
12 Id. at 233. Since 1994, the Chinese Patent Office, and later SIPO, has served as an
international searching authority for PCT purposes. Id.
13 Steve Lohr, When Innovation, Too, Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at BU3.
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year.14 This focus is understandable: if that target is reached, SIPO will
handle a total of at least ten million patent applications during 2015–
2020!
Taking note of this gigantic number, one cannot help but wonder if
SIPO’s forecast is accurate and realistic. One may further query whether
the highly ambitious goals set by the National Patent Development
Strategy, if met, will result in a quick deterioration of the overall quality
of Chinese patents.15 For example, policymakers, commentators, and
practitioners expressed concern over the perverse incentives created by
the Chinese government’s subsidies for patenting activities, which they
claimed would distort the total number of domestic applications.16
Likewise, Mark Liang questioned SIPO’s ability to thoroughly examine
these patents and by extension the quality of Chinese patents:
[T]here is reason to doubt whether the quality of the patents being
applied for and granted in China. The burst in Chinese patenting
activity is a product in large part from the Central Government’s
“innovation agenda,”—a leading component of which are generous

14 See, e.g., id.; DAN PRUD’HOMME, DULLING THE CUTTING-EDGE: HOW PATENT-RELATED
POLICIES AND PRACTICES HAMPER INNOVATION IN CHINA 6 (2012), available at
http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/upload/media/media/27/patentstudy2012%5B766%5D.pdf.
15 Cf. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 12 (2004) (“[T]he rapid increase in the rate of patenting has been accompanied by a
proliferation of patent awards of dubious merit.”).
16 As noted in a Reuters article:

[L]egal experts said China would need to do more before it can lead the world in
innovation as the quality of patents needed to improve.
The government provided attractive incentives for companies in China to file
patent applications, regardless of whether a patent was eventually granted, they said.
“The idea of subsidizing patents is not bad in itself, however it is a blunt
instrument because you get high figures for filings, but it does not tell you anything
about the quality of the patents filed,” said Elliot Papageorgiou, a Partner and
Executive at law firm Rouse Legal (China).
“One thing is volume, quality is quite another. The return, or the percentage of
grants, of the patents is still not as high in China as, say, in the U.S., Japan or some
places in Europe,” he said.
Lee Chyen Yee, China Tops U.S., Japan to Become Top Patent Filer, REUTERS, Dec. 21, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/us-china-patents-idUSTRE7BK0LQ20111221.
An
article in The Economist concurred:
[T]here are reasons for scepticism. The bureaucrats in Chinese patent offices are paid
more if they approve more patents, say local lawyers. That must tempt them to say yes
to ideas of dubious originality. And the generosity of China’s incentives for patentfiling may make it worthwhile for companies and individuals to patent even worthless
ideas. “Patents are easy to file,” says Tony Chen, a patent attorney with Jones Day in
Shanghai, “but gems are hard to find in a mountain of junk.”
A cottage industry has sprung up to produce patents of suspect value. On Taobao,
the Chinese eBay, patent writers and filers advertise their services for as little as 700
yuan for individuals or 2,000 yuan for corporations. Most of these patents are probably
filed with the expectation that they will be ignored.
Innovation in China: Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 78.
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incentives for patent filings. For example, Chinese companies who
file above a certain number of patents receive significant tax breaks.
Tenure is more likely for university professors who are able to obtain
patents. Patent application fees for qualifying individuals and
companies are entirely subsidized by local governments. These
incentives, among others, are all part and parcel of the agenda’s
stated goal of 2 million patent filings (of any type) by 2015, making
China’s SIPO far and away the world’s busiest patent office.17

Most recently, Dan Prud’homme, the business manager of the IPR
Working Group and R&D Forum at the European Union Chamber of
Commerce in China, published a highly critical report documenting the
myriad problems confronting the Chinese patent system.18 Focusing
again on patent quality, the report declared:
While patents are exploding in China and certain innovation is also
on the rise, patent quality has not proportionately kept up and in fact
the overall strength of China’s actual innovation appears overhyped.
Statistical analysis in this study not only reveals concerning trends in
the quality of China’s patents at present, but suggests that while
patent filings in China will likely continue to notably grow in the
future, patent quality may continue to lag these numbers. In fact,
projections in this study indicate there might be over 2.6 million lessthan-“highest-quality” patents filed in China in 2015 alone, which is
substantially more than estimated “highest-quality” patents filings in
that year. With this in mind, and objectively considering its
performance on additional innovation metrics, it is clear that China’s
innovation ecosystem deserves a new type of scrutiny.19

The report further discussed “how a network of patent-related policies,
other measures, and practices in China collectively hamper both patent
quality and innovation at large.”20 It ended with the conclusion that
“overall, China still lags behind many developed countries in terms of
innovation at large and quality patents in particular, let alone
breakthrough innovation and highest-quality patents.”21
While criticisms directed at the Chinese patent system are not
unfounded, it is important to think about whether an overly heavy focus
on patent metrics or targets would lead one to miss the forest for the
trees. To begin with, the two million figure collectively covers three
different types of patents: invention patents, utility model patents, and
design patents. While invention patents are granted only after careful
17 Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Possible Remedies, 11 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478, 482 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
18 PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14.
19 Id. at 1 (emphasis omitted).
20 Id. These policies, measures and practices include “government-set patent targets and
indicators . . . ; policies and other measures meant to promote patents . . . ; and rules and
procedures for reviewing patent applications and those for enforcing patents.” Id.
21 Id. at 19.
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substantive examinations by patent agents, utility models and designs
are granted without any substantive examination.22 Similar to
innovation patents in Australia, Gebrauchsmuster in Germany, shortterm patents in Hong Kong, utility models in Japan or South Korea, or
petty patents in Indonesia or Thailand,23 the utility model patent in
China “was set up to invite broader participation in inventive
enterprises, especially by smaller collective enterprises and private
citizens who are less likely to have resources devoted to invention
patents.”24 As a result, the inventiveness required for utility model
applications is much lower than that required for invention patent
applications.25
Thus, if accurate comparisons are to be made between China and
other countries—say, the United States—it is important to focus on
invention patents alone—or, even better, patents for domestic inventions
alone.26 In 2011, for example, the total number of applications for and
grants of patents for domestic inventions in China were 415,829 and

22 See Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 39–40 (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009)
(China), translated at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200804/
t20080416_380327.html (requiring substantive examination for invention patents, but only
preliminary examination for utility model and design patents).
23 See Uma Suthersanen, Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries 40–42
(UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development Series, Issue Paper No. 13,
2006); see also id. at 1 (“There are currently approximately 75 countries which provide, in some
form or another, utility model protection. . . . [M]ajor industrial nations which have adopted the
utility model regime include Japan, South Korea and Germany.”); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual
Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 389–90 (2012) (noting the
importance of utility models and other alternative innovation models to developing countries).
For discussions of utility models, see generally INNOVATION WITHOUT PATENTS: HARNESSING
THE CREATIVE SPIRIT IN A DIVERSE WORLD (Uma Suthersanen, Graham Dutfield & Kit Boey
Chow eds., 2007); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Legal Framework for the
Protection of Utility Models, 4 WIPO J. (forthcoming 2013); Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent
Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151 (1999); Suthersanen, supra.
24 PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 170 (2d ed. 2003).
25 As Dan Prud’homme wrote:

[O]n one hand, given their higher invalidation rates and higher risk of being filed
solely for and used in “malicious prosecution actions,” utility models are considered of
lower quality than invention patents. On the other hand, it is important to recognise that
a variety of evidence debunks the idea that utility model patents are always of low
value, whereas a range of empirical studies show that the utility model system in
certain countries successfully enables movement from relatively low levels of
innovation and competitiveness, and poor diffusion of technology, to higher levels.
PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 3.
26 Similarly, Mark Liang observed:
[I]n assessing the inventive prowess of the two countries, the relevant figure should be
the number of indigenous patent filings. Foreign filings say nothing about each
country’s inventiveness and should therefore be excluded. In sum, a proper comparison
is the number of Chinese-origin invention applications filed at the SIPO versus the
number of U.S.-origin utility applications at the PTO.
Liang, supra note 17, at 490 (footnote omitted).
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112,347, respectively.27 Those figures already exceeded the
corresponding figures in the United States, which amounted to only
247,750 and 108,626, respectively.28
Although one could argue that the quality of invention patents in
China compares less favorably with that of the United States, it is
important not to lose sight of the fact that the number of patent
applications for domestic inventions in China can only increase—and,
in my view, increase rapidly. At some point, that number would be so
enormous that quantity would present a much bigger problem than
quality. As Mark Cohen, the former senior intellectual property attaché
at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, pointed out in an interview:
“[S]ometimes quantity is quality in patents, at least in terms of
litigation. Having a thicket of patents that one can assert can be very
meaningful in driving a license or a settlement.”29 If the so-called
“national champions” in China,30 such as ZTE Corporation and Huawei
Technologies, are able to acquire a large number of patents, they likely
will have a significant advantage over foreign firms having a much
smaller number.
Second, when one takes into consideration the total number of
current patent applications in China, the two million figure is not as
unrealistic as it sounds. According to the official statistics, the total
number of patent applications in 2011 already reached 1,633,347.31 That
number represented a growth rate of about 34%, up from 1,222,286 in
2010. Out of these applications, 526,412 were for invention patents,
409,836 for utility models, and 421,273 for designs. If the projected
growth rate for all patents combined is a meager 5.2%, China will have
reached two million patent applications by 2015. With a growth rate of
about 34% in 2011, it is hard to imagine how that rate could drastically
slow down to less than 5.2% even if one assumes that the global
economic crisis has significantly slowed down patent applications in
27 SIPO, Table 1 Distribution of Applications for Inventions Received from Home and
Abroad, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2011/12/201201/t20120116_641774.html (Jan. 16,
2012); SIPO, Table 4 Distribution of Grants for Inventions Received from Home and Abroad,
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2011/12/201201/t20120116_641766.html (Jan. 16, 2012).
28 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963–2011,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last modified May 21, 2012).
29 Whitney Stenger, Mark Cohen: Global Intellectual Property Ambassador, 15 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 41, 45 (2011).
30 See ODED SHENKAR, COPYCATS: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE IMITATION TO GAIN A
STRATEGIC EDGE 158 (2010) (noting “the government’s strategy of consolidating strategic
industries . . . to create national champions that can hold their own in global markets and . . . to
restore its imperial glory”); TOM DOCTOROFF, WHAT CHINESE WANT: CULTURE, COMMUNISM
AND THE MODERN CHINESE CONSUMER 15–16 (2012) (discussing China’s mobilization of
resources for critical strategic undertakings at the national level).
31 All the figures in this paragraph are taken from SIPO, Comparative Table 1 Contemporary
Quantity Comparison of Three Kinds of Patents Received from Home and Abroad Between 2010
and 2011, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2011/12/201201/t20120116_641768.html (Jan. 16,
2012).
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China.
Third, while it is fair to question the quality of Chinese patents, it
is more insightful to compare the actual patent quality across countries,
as opposed to making comparisons based on idealistic standards.32 In
the United States, for example, the low quality of patents granted by the
USPTO had led to repeated calls for patent reform.33 These reform
demands eventually led to the recent adoption of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act34 and a complete overhaul of the U.S. patent
system. More than a decade ago before the adoption of this statute,
commentators and practitioners alike began vocally criticizing the low
quality of U.S. patents, which they attributed to “budgetary limitations,
an exploding filing rate, and the increasing range of patentable subject
matter.”35 In a widely cited study, John Allison and Mark Lemley
showed shockingly that U.S. courts had found the patent invalid in 46%
of the 300 final validity decisions examined.36 Recently, Carlos Correa
also observed:
In the US . . . , patent owner’s likelihood of success in patent validity
challenges is only 51 per cent if the trial is heard before a judge
alone. If the trial is heard before a judge and jury: 68 per cent.
Overall chances of success for the patent owner if the trial is held in
Massachusetts and Northern California, respectively: 30 per cent, 68
per cent.37

If these observations indeed reflect the actual quality of U.S. patents,
one has to wonder whether the concern over the quality of Chinese
patents is significantly different from the criticism of low patent quality
in other parts of the world.
Fourth, evaluating patent quality is inherently difficult. As Dan
Prud’homme reminded us:
There has long been a debate on what exactly a definition of “patent
quality” should entail. One conventional definition is that patent
32 Cf. Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 13 (2010)
(questioning whether researchers should “measure the countries against an idealised yardstick of
effective intellectual property protection and enforcement” when they make cross-country
comparisons of piracy and counterfeiting).
33 For discussions of problems within the U.S. patent system, see generally U.S. FED. TRADE
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT
LAW AND POLICY (2003); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 15; A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004).
34 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
35 John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 728 (2002).
36 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
37 Carlos M. Correa, The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for Developing
Countries, in INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 22, THE GLOBAL
DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 27, 67 n.84 (2009).
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quality is determined by legal compliance with core statutory
requirements for patentability. Others look at the commercial value
of a patent, and in the same vein look at patents that are maintained
over an extended amount of time such that they can be
commercialised to make profits. Yet others suggest that patents that
are not commercially valuable can still be of good quality according
to statutory criteria. Some use frequency of patent citations in patent
literature and also sometimes in non-patent literature as a gauge of
the significance of a patent and thus its quality. Some define quality
in relative terms, whereas higher quality patents exclusively refer to
inventions that would not have been made without the incentive
afforded by their patent protection. Yet others, particularly observers
of China’s patent system, appear to only consider invention patents
as of good quality, whereas all non-invention patents (or utility
models in particular), are “junk” (low quality). Yet other definitions
may be used.38

Focusing on the specific Chinese context, Mark Cohen further declared:
It is . . . very hard to benchmark the quality of individual patents. By
China’s own data, quality is improving. By certain patent quality
surrogate data—such as the number of service versus non-service
inventions, patents that are commercialized, field of use, whether
patents are maintained throughout their useful life, type of patents
(invention patent versus utility model or designs)—there are more
and more patent grants that have commercial viability. However,
there are no citation rates. So in other words, it cannot be determined
if a particular patent has been cited by subsequent patents. That
would be a very important, perhaps the most important, indicator of
patent quality. Whether patents are filed internationally though the
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) or through national phase filings
would be another important indicator, as international filings are
generally reserved for higher quality patents due to their cost and
international significance.
Field of use is especially critical. It is very hard to analyze bulk
patent data, because one patent in the bio-tech or pharmaceutical
(pharma) sector can be significantly more valuable than five hundred
in the IT sector. There have not been many blockbuster pharma
products coming out of China, so one cannot really equate 10,000
patents in China’s IT sector to 10,000 patents in the pharma sector.
Perhaps the most significant new medicines have in fact been based
on traditional Chinese medicine, like Artemisinin and Tamiflu. On
the other hand, there used to be many patents related to food
products, fermentation, and the like in China that probably had very
limited commercial use. There has also been a closer alignment
between what China manufacturers are producing in the IT sector

38

PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 22 (footnotes omitted).
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and what Chinese inventors are patenting. This is a positive sign.39

Finally, the important point about China’s recent developments in
the patent area is not so much about how many patent applications SIPO
will receive by 2015 or how many patents the office will eventually
grant. Rather, it is about how China’s patent system has quickly turned
around in fewer than thirty years. From the “four patents and six
inventor certificates” granted between 1950 and 1963,40 to a world
record–breaking 3,455 applications filed on April 1, 1985 (the first day
the Patent Law went into effect),41 to the two million patent applications
SIPO now projects for 2015, the Chinese patent system has indeed
come a very long way.
In fact, this system has arguably accomplished what no other
patent system in the world has ever achieved—be it the system in
Germany, Japan, or the United States. Thus, as much as mainstream
media are content with perpetuating the decades-old discussion of
massive piracy and counterfeiting in China, and as much as industries
continue to demand tighter measures to enforce intellectual property
rights, one has to wonder whether these two groups have missed some
very important recent developments concerning the Chinese patent
system. Today, China already has the world’s largest volume of
domestic patent applications. It is only a matter of time before China
overtakes the United States, Japan, and Germany to become the world’s
leader in filing international patent applications.
II. QUESTION 2: WHAT DO CHINESE POLICYMAKERS HAVE IN MIND
WHEN THEY MENTION “INDEPENDENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY”?
Although highly ambitious, SIPO’s National Patent Development
Strategy does not represent an isolated effort undertaken by an
individual government agency. Instead, it was “formulated for the
purpose of thoroughly implementing the Outline of the National

39

Stenger, supra note 22, at 45–46. Mark Liang concurred:

Patent quality is inherently difficult to quantify using numeric metrics. Assessing the
objective “value” of a patent or the inventiveness of a patent is an imprecise science
that presents a number of normative and positive issues. Measuring the quality of the
patent examination process also presents a number of challenges—what measures may
be used to assess efficiency, thoroughness, and accuracy?
Even assuming that the quality of patents or their examination can be measured
using some number or score, there remains the issue of how to calculate the score.
What variables and formulas should the calculation use? The challenge is all the more
daunting with China and the SIPO, given the relative lack of transparency and
available data.
Liang, supra note 17, at 491–92 (footnote omitted).
40 PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA 3 (2005).
41 FENG, supra note 24, at 168.
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Intellectual Property Strategy.”42 Released in June 2008, this Outline
laid out the State Council’s comprehensive plan to improve the
protection and management of intellectual property rights in China.43
Paragraph 7 specifically emphasized the need for active development of
“zizhu zhishi chanquan,”44 which is translated herein as “independent
intellectual property.” As the Paragraph stated:
The level of the self-relied intellectual property will be higher by a
large margin and the quantity of intellectual property will be greater.
China will rank among the advanced countries of the world in terms
of the annual number of patents for inventions granted to the
domestic applicants, while the number of overseas patent
applications filed by Chinese applicants should greatly increase. A
number of world-famous brands will emerge. The proportion of the
GDP accounted for by the value of core copyright industries will
greatly increase. China should own the rights to a number of highquality new varieties of plants and high-level layout-designs of
integrated circuits. Trade secrets, geographical indications, genetic
resources, traditional knowledge as well as folklores will be
effectively protected and reasonably utilized.45

Paragraph 7 further identified three other goals for 2008–2013:
— The benefits of utilizing . . . IPRs . . . will be increased
significantly and the proportion of products rich in IPRs should grow
significantly. Enterprises should make progress in improving their
system for managing intellectual property, invest more in the area of
intellectual property and significantly improve their capacity to
utilize intellectual property in market competition. A number of
preponderant enterprises with famous brands, core intellectual
property and rich experience in utilizing the intellectual property
system will emerge.
— The protection of IPRs will be significantly improved.
Infringement of IPRs, such as piracy and counterfeiting, should be
significantly reduced, the expense of protecting intellectual property
right will decrease a great deal and abuse of intellectual property
should be effectively curbed.
— The awareness of the IPRs in society, especially among market
entities, will be greatly enhanced and a favorable intellectual
property culture should be basically formed.46

Launched shortly before the adoption of the Third Amendment to

42
43

NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, supra note 9, pmbl.
STATE COUNCIL, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY
(2008), translated at http://english.gov.cn/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm [hereinafter
NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY].
44 Id. ¶ 7.
45 Id.
46 Id.

90

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

2013

the Chinese Patent Law,47 the State Council’s National Intellectual
Property Strategy dovetailed the growing recognition by the fourthgeneration Chinese leadership of the economic and strategic importance
of a well-functioning intellectual property system. As President Hu
Jintao remarked in the Group Study of the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in May 2006:
Strengthening the building of China’s system of intellectual property
right and vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation,
management, protection and application regarding intellectual
property are our urgent need for the purpose of enhancing
independent and self-driven innovation capabilities and building an
innovation-oriented country.48

Likewise, Premier Wen Jiabo observed: “One thing necessary to stress
is the need to concretely strengthen IP protection. In the new era, global
science and technology competition, as well as economic competition,
is primarily a competition of IP rights. Promoting IP protection
therefore promotes and inspires innovation.”49
At a much broader economic level, both the State Council’s
National Intellectual Property Strategy and SIPO’s National Patent
Development Strategy tied well to a growing array of nationwide
initiatives launched to promote independent innovation (zizhu
chuangxin).50 Such promotion indeed has been designated as one of the
four guiding principles in the Outline of the National Medium- and
Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006–
2020).51 Published in February 2006, this fifteen-year plan formally
47 See generally Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder: Three Decades of Development of the
Chinese Patent System, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW (Margo Bagley & Ruth
Okediji eds., forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Yu, Building the Ladder] (discussing the Third
Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law).
48 Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of Progress: The Development of the Intellectual
Property System in China, 1 WIPO J. 117, 120 (2009); see also PANG LAIKWAN, CREATIVITY
AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
OFFENSES 8 (2012) (“If gaige kaifang (reform and open) was the dominant policy principle of the
PRC government in the 1980s and 1990s, the recent Hu Jintao government has shifted its
attention to gaige chuangxin (reform and innovation), emphasizing the importance of innovation
and production of the new.” (Chinese characters omitted)); Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra
note 1, at 189–96 (discussing the need to convince Chinese leaders of the benefits of intellectual
property protection).
49 SIPO, China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2008, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/
whitepapers/200904/t20090427_457167.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2012).
50 See PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 75–115 (discussing some of these initiatives). For
discussions of China’s indigenous innovation policy, see generally An Siyuan & Brian Peck,
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy in the Context of Its WTO Obligations and Commitments,
42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 375 (2011); Daniel Chow, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies and the
World Trade Organization, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2013); Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, supra note 4, at 1122–24.
51 STATE COUNCIL, THE OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PLAN FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (2006–2020) § II(1) (2006) [hereinafter NATIONAL
MEDIUMAND
LONG-TERM
PLAN],
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-
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declared the State Council’s commitment to turn China into an
innovation-based economy by 2020. As the Plan defined, “[i]ndigenous
[or independent] innovation refers to enhancing original innovation,
integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and
absorption of imported technology, in order improve our national
innovation capability.”52
Although the goals behind policies introduced to promote
independent innovation have been vague and unclear at times, they
quickly attracted criticisms from U.S. rights holders and their supportive
government.53 As the USTR noted in the 2010 National Trade Estimate
Report on Foreign Trade Barriers:
A troubling trend that has emerged . . . is China’s willingness to
encourage domestic or “indigenous” innovation at the cost of foreign
innovation and technologies. For example, . . . in November 2009,
China issued the Circular on Launching the 2009 National
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work with the aim of
improving “indigenous” innovation in computer and other
technology equipment. In order to qualify as “indigenous”
innovation under the accreditation system, and therefore be entitled
to procurement preferences, a product’s intellectual property must
originally be registered in China.54

Notwithstanding the concerns registered by U.S. rights holders and
their supportive government, indigenous innovation policies have both
benefits and drawbacks. As I testified before the ITC in June 2010, such
policies can be beneficial when they help encourage the development of
local stakeholders.55 For more than a decade, industries and
02/09/content_183787.htm
and
translated
at
http://www.etiea.cn/data/attachment/
123%286%29.pdf. For discussions of this fifteen-year plan, see generally Cao Cong, Richard P.
Suttmeier & Denis Fred Simon, China’s 15-year Science and Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY,
Dec. 2006, at 38; Feng Xiaoqing, The Interaction Between Enhancing the Capacity for
Independent Innovation and Patent Protection: A Perspective on the Third Amendment to the
Patent Law of the P.R. China, 9 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, ¶ 7 (2008); Liang, supra note 17, at
483–84. The other three principles are “leapfrogging in priority fields, enabling development, and
leading the future.” NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PLAN, supra, § II(1).
52 NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 51, § II(1).
53 For criticisms of China’s independent innovation policies, see generally ROBERT D.
ATKINSON, ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: CONFRONTING CHINESE INNOVATION MERCANTILISM (2012),
available at http://www2.itif.org/2012-enough-enough-chinese-mercantilism.pdf; JAMES
MCGREGOR, CHINA’S DRIVE FOR “INDIGENOUS INNOVATION” A WEB OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
(2010),
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/
100728chinareport_0.pdf. See also Assessing China’s Efforts to Become an “Innovation
Society”—A Progress Report: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Security Review Comm’n,
112th
Cong.
(2012),
available
at
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2012hearings/
written_testimonies/hr12_05_10.php [hereinafter USCC Hearing].
54 U.S. TRADE REP., 2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS 69 (2010).
55 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INV. NO. 322-514, USITC PUB. NO. 4199, CHINA:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND
FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY, at D-20 (2010), available
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commentators, myself included, have argued for the need to develop a
critical mass of local stakeholders to help push for stronger intellectual
property protection from the inside.56 It is therefore highly encouraging
that many Chinese leaders and nationals now finally realize the
importance and benefits of indigenous innovation. The more local
innovation there is, the more likely Chinese policymakers and the public
at large will support greater intellectual property reforms in the future.
Nevertheless, indigenous innovation policies can be harmful if they
discriminate against foreign firms. Such discriminatory policies easily
bring to mind bad experiences foreign policymakers and industries
encountered in the past. These experiences included the self-reliance
and import substitution policies practiced during the Mao era57 and the
dreaded Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue introduced
in the mid-1990s. As noted China scholar Stanley Lubman recounted:
In June 1995, the State Planning Commission issued investment
guidelines in a “Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue”
that classified projects as “encouraged,” “permitted,” “restricted” and
“discouraged.” (Other internal guidelines also existed, which limited
the market share that foreign firms could have in certain industries.)
Then, in January, 1998, new guidelines were issued. The category of
“encouraged” investments displayed a heightened emphasis on
advanced technology; some types of projects now faced the
additional requirement of high output capacities; others were moved
to the “restricted” category, while controls were increased in some
areas were already in that category. Subsequent revisions of the
Catalogue have seemed to reflect movement in China’s national
policy toward FDI and selective encouragement, rather than
emphasizing tight control over foreign presences in the economy.
This suggests that investors whose projects fall within the
“encouraged” or “permitted” categories ought to find the approval
process fairly routine, while those who wish to apply for investments
at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf (summarizing the Author’s testimony).
56 See, e.g., AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE—CHINA, AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CHINA 42
(2006),
available
at
http://www.amcham-china.org.cn/amcham/upload/wysiwyg/
20060516094503.pdf (recommending that the “successful realization of [China’s] innovation
priorities is the upside inducement for the Chinese to implement the fundamental reforms
necessary to guarantee protection of IPR”); Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported
Counterfeit Goods: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Security Comm’n, 109th Cong. 257
(2006) (statement of Timothy Trainer, President, Global Intellectual Property Strategy Center)
(noting the need “to address the true local interested parties, the local entrepreneurs and how they
can be commercially and economically empowered to benefit from IP”); Peter K. Yu, The
Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 431–33 (2003) (discussing the need to create local
stakeholders in the intellectual property system); Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at
958–59 (providing an example to illustrate the benefits of developing local stakeholders in the
intellectual property system).
57 See Cao et al., supra note 51, at 40 (“In its ambiguity[,] zizhu chuangxin . . . has been
construed by some as a regression to the self-defeating techno-nationalist notions of self-reliance
(zili gengsheng) from the Maoist period, during which Chinese research and innovation were
largely cut off from the international community and consequently were significantly retarded.”).

2013

FIVE OFT-REPEATED QUESTIONS

93

in the “restricted” category will encounter greater difficulty. More
recent adjustments, however, have also closed some areas or shifted
them out of the “encouraged” category.58

Thus, when these disturbing past experiences were taken into
consideration, and when indigenous innovation policies were linked to
the large and fast-growing Chinese government procurement market,59
U.S. policymakers and industries understandably feared the deleterious
effects of these new policies.60 Ultimately, whether the policies are good
or bad will depend on how they are structured—for example, whether
they discriminate against foreign firms. If the policies are
discriminatory, they not only will endanger foreign industries, but will
also threaten to violate China’s commitments under the WTO or other
international agreements.61
To be certain, most foreign industries, policymakers, and
commentators would hope that local policymakers in China could
develop a right mix of policies that promote only good indigenous
innovation. In reality, however, it is very rare for policymakers to get
their policies completely right from the get-go without any trial and
error. This is particularly true when policymakers are only beginning to
understand the importance and benefits of indigenous innovation—for
example, what it means to have indigenous innovation and how they
can bring forth more of such innovation?
Thus, foreign policymakers and industries should avoid having
knee-jerk resistance to China’s indigenous innovation policies—even
when flaws emerge. It is also important to carefully separate good
indigenous innovation policies that do not benefit foreign firms from
bad indigenous innovation policies that intentionally discriminate
against those firms. After all, from the standpoint of intellectual
property reform, it is urgent that Chinese leaders and the public at large
better understand the importance and benefits of indigenous innovation.
Such understanding is likely to provide long-term benefits for foreign
firms and intellectual property rights holders.
While the adoption of indigenous innovation policies has already
sparked many interesting, and at times intense, debates, the emphasis on
“zizhu zhishi chanquan” in the State Council’s National Intellectual
58 Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 19 (2006) (footnote
omitted).
59 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Fact Sheet: 23rd U.S.-China Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade, available at http://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2012/12/19/factsheet-23rd-us-china-joint-commission-commerce-and-trade (last updated Dec. 19, 2012) (“China
reported that in 2011 government procurement was $179 billion. . . . China’s government
procurement has been growing at 25 percent per year over the past seven years.”).
60 See An & Peck, supra note 50, at 442 (“The primary reason why China’s indigenous
innovation measures are drawing so much attention is basically an economic one—China’s
government procurement market is one of the largest in the world, and the indigenous innovation
measures may result in restricting or even closing this market to foreign companies.”).
61 See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 4, at 1123.
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Property Strategy has raised a different set of questions.62 To begin
with, the term “zizhu zhishi chanquan” does not directly translate to
“indigenous intellectual property.” In fact, finding the right translation
for this term has been particularly challenging; such a task is
challenging for not only foreign policymakers and industry
representatives, but also seasoned analysts who have closely followed
China’s intellectual property developments—domestic and foreign
alike.
As with many other Chinese terms, the term “zizhu zhishi
chanquan” does not translate well from Chinese to English. While “zhi”
can be easily translated to “self,” “zhu” is much more complicated. As a
noun, the word refers to “master,” “owner,” or “host.” As a verb, the
word refers to “direct” or “manage.” As an adjective, the word refers to
“chief” or “main.” Thus, policymakers, commentators, and the media
have translated “zizhu” to “self-relied,” “self-driven,” “self-controlled,”
“self-owned,” “indigenous,” “homegrown,” or “independent.”63 Out of
all the terms, the word “independent” seems to best capture the term’s
original meaning while preserving its useful Western connotations.
In his highly critical report on the Chinese patent system, Dan
Prud’homme traced the origin of the term “zizhu zhishi chanquan” to
the automotive policies in the mid-1990s:
Consultations suggest that the term originated in the mid-1990s
[when] it was used in policy advice to build domestic IPR in the
Chinese automobile industry. At the turn of the new millennium, the
term was used in important policy guidance, which is still in effect,
from state leader Jiang Zemin at an April 2nd 2000 conference on the
Exhibition on China’s Fifteen-Year Achievements in Patent Work.
There is solid evidence . . . that the term typically means IP
ownership, including acquired ownership, by a Chinese entity, which
in some cases expressly is said to exclude entities with a majority
foreign ownership.64

When this origin is taken into account, the term “zizhu” intellectual
property certainly covers more than “indigenous” or “homegrown”
intellectual property. Although the term “independent intellectual
property” does not provide a direct translation, it accurately reflects that
“zizhu” intellectual property can be developed or acquired from abroad
or involve China-based entities with minority foreign ownership.65 The
key to identifying certain intellectual property as “zizhu” is whether

62
63

See NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 43, ¶ 7.
See, e.g., id.; PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 79; Wu, supra note 48, at 121; Yu, Middle
Kingdom, supra note 1, at 247.
64 PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 79 (footnotes omitted).
65 See id. at 82 (“[C]onsultations with two Chinese lawyers and an ex-government official
based in China . . . confirm the term in practice is meant to refer to IPR on core technology owned
by a Chinese entity that in no way is reliant on a foreign entity/influence.”).
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such an asset is independently controlled by Chinese individuals, firms,
or the government. Understanding such a key feature not only helps us
better appreciate the goals behind the State Council’s National
Intellectual Property Strategy, but also raises important questions about
whether the present discussion about China’s indigenous innovation
policies has been under-inclusive and somewhat wrong-headed.
Moreover, if achieving economic and technological independence
is a key goal behind the State Council’s adoption of the National
Intellectual Property Strategy,66 one cannot ignore the link of this key
goal to the developing countries’ ongoing frustration with the existing
international intellectual property regime. Since the adoption of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement),67 these countries repeatedly registered their
concerns and disappointments over the inappropriately high standards
of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.68 In the
past decade, these concerns and disappointments were further
exacerbated by the developed countries’ active push for the
establishment of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade, investment,
and intellectual property agreements.69
To be certain, China’s interests are somewhat different from those
of many developing countries. Technically, China is what I have
66 As the State Council declared in the National Intellectual Property Strategy, “Implementing
the national intellectual property strategy to greatly promote China’s capacity in creation,
utilization, protection and administration of intellectual property will help improve China’s
capacity for independent innovation and aid in efforts to make China an innovative country.”
NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 51, § II(1). In the context of
“independent innovation,” the State Council further stated in the National Medium- and LongTerm Plan:

[O]ne should be clearly aware that importation of technology without emphasizing
assimilation, absorption, and re-innovation is bound to weaken the nation’s indigenous
R&D capability, which in turn widens the gap with world advanced levels. Facts have
proved that, in areas critical to the national economy and security, core technologies
cannot be purchased. If our country wants to take the initiative in the fierce
international competition, it has to enhance its indigenous innovation capability, master
core technologies in some critical areas, own proprietary intellectual property rights,
and build a number of internationally competitive enterprises. In a word, the
improvement of indigenous innovation capability must be made a national strategy that
is implemented in all sectors, industries, and regions so as to drastically enhance the
nation’s competitiveness.
Id.
67 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
68 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 379–86
(2006) (discussing the developing countries’ discontent with the TRIPS-based international
intellectual property system).
69 For the Author’s earlier criticisms of these nonmultilateral agreements, see generally Peter
K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1, 9–12 (2011); Peter K. Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392–
400 (2004); Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 961–86 (2011).
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described as a “middle intellectual property power”; it possesses a large
and fast-growing aggregate economy and high technological and
innovative capabilities.70 As a result, it does obtain benefits from the
existing international intellectual property system despite its continuous
criticism of that system. Nevertheless, China still aligns more closely
with the developing world than with the developed world, due in large
part to the country’s continuous struggle with internal problems, uneven
regional, sectoral, and technological developments, limited resources on
a per capita basis, and other reasons unrelated to intellectual property
protection and enforcement (such as the importance of retaining
leadership in the developing world).71 In fact, China remains reluctant to
increase intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs, notwithstanding its already fastgrowing industries in entertainment, software, semiconductors, and
selected areas of biotechnology.72
In sum, it remains unclear what international intellectual property
system China will ultimately prefer. If the Chinese patent system
continues to develop, there is a very good chance that China may prefer
a system that better aligns with its historical traditions, cultural
backgrounds, socio-economic conditions, ideological values, and policy
preferences. As I observed in the inaugural issue of The WIPO Journal:
Although intellectual property protections in [emerging countries
such as Brazil, China, and India] will no doubt improve in the near
future, there is no guarantee that these countries will be interested in
retaining the existing intellectual property system once they cross
over to the other side of the intellectual property divide. Instead,
these “new champions” may want to develop something different—
something that builds upon their historical traditions and cultural
backgrounds and that takes account of their drastically different
socio-economic conditions.73

Thus, how China develops its independent innovation polices, or
independent intellectual property, is likely to have a significant impact
on the future development of the international intellectual property
system.

70 See generally Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES (Tom Ginsburg & Randall Peerenboom eds.,
forthcoming 2013) (discussing the emergence of “middle intellectual property powers”).
71 See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property
Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 21–32 [hereinafter Yu, Regime Complex]; Yu, Middle
Kingdom, supra note 1, at 229–30, 234.
72 See Yu, Regime Complex, supra note 71, at 25–26.
73 Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future, 1
WIPO J. 1, 13 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order].
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III. QUESTION 3: IS THERE A GRAND STRATEGY BEHIND CHINA’S
RECENT PUSH FOR PATENT DEVELOPMENTS?
When one closely studies the State Council’s National Intellectual
Property Strategy, SIPO’s National Patent Development Strategy, and
other plans and measures introduced at the national, provincial, and
municipal levels to implement these strategies, it is not hard to notice
the careful planning and strategizing behind the Chinese government’s
effort. Equally blatant is China’s eagerness to catch up with other
developed countries—both economically and technologically. If one is
willing to go beyond the intellectual property area, one could even
include the State Council’s National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for
Science and Technology Development, which laid out China’s current
science and technology policy and sought to turn China into an
innovation-based economy by 2020.
Taken together, these various strategies, plans, and measures may
suggest China’s success in devising a grand strategy to play economic
and technological catch-up with developed countries. As Ikechi
Mgbeoji noted in an interview with the Financial Post:
I’m amused when I listen to people who speak in a patronizing
manner about China, as if the Chinese did not know what they’re
doing and suddenly they have now seen the light and have embraced
the international patent system and so forth. . . . No, this was a
deliberate policy of the Chinese state. It was a calculated and well
planned thing. It wasn’t as though they didn’t understand the value of
patents. . . . It was because they understood if they had very strong
patent system at that stage in their development there will only be
payment to foreign patent owners. So what they did was have a
regime in place where they were free to copy, to steal ideas from
other countries.74

Professor Mgbeoji’s assessment was both correct and incorrect. He
was correct in pointing out that China has maintained a sustained effort
to build up capacity to catch up with developed economies. Since the
Deng Xiaoping–led second-generation leadership reopened the
domestic market to foreign trade, catching up has been a major goal
behind China’s national policies.75 Such catching-up was indeed
necessary in the wake of the country’s ill-advised import substitution
policies (which made the country technologically backward) and the
Cultural Revolution (which cost the country a decade of productivity,
74 Jameson
Berkow, Patent Dragon Awakes, FIN. POST, Nov. 7, 2011,
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/11/07/patent-dragon-awakes/ (quoting Ikechi Mgbeoji,
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University).
75 See Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to
Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 1, 27–28 (2001)
[hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives].
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training, and technological development).76
In a forthcoming book chapter, I described how China built a
patent ladder step-by-step in its effort to play economic and
technological catch-up with developed countries.77 To a large extent,
China’s experience illustrates well how the development of a wellfunctioning patent system can serve as an essential tool to foster
economic development and technological proficiency. That experience
is also not that different from the policies practiced by other oncedeveloping countries. As William Kingston reminded us: “From the
start of the industrial revolution, every country that became
economically great began by copying: the Germans copied the British;
the Americans copied the British and the Germans, and the Japanese
copied everybody.”78 History is indeed filled with stories about how
countries have successfully “crossed over” from the developing,
copycat stage to the developed, innovative stage.79 Interestingly, for our
purposes, no country has ever become economically developed without
also gaining more respect for intellectual property rights. Thus, if
China’s developments indeed follow this well-treaded path, in the near
future it likely will join other once-developing countries in crossing
over from a pirating nation to an intellectual property–respecting
nation.80
Nevertheless, Professor Mgbeoji was incorrect in overstating the
grand strategy Chinese leaders were able to devise. Having a national
goal of catching up with developed economies is very different from
76 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 1, at 198; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and
Perspectives, supra note 75, at 21–22.
77 See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 47.
78 William Kingston, An Agenda for Radical Intellectual Property Reform, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 653, 658 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds.,
2005).
79 See Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 6, at 533–43 (discussing the United States’ crossover
experience).
80 See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 1, at 175 (“[H]istory suggests that China is now simply
following the economic development paths of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan—or even Germany and the United States. It is only a matter of time before China is
converted from a pirating nation to a country that respects intellectual property rights.”). Noted
China scholar Kenneth Lieberthal concurred:

Every current advanced industrial economy went through a phase of development
characterized by widespread theft of intellectual property. But over time in each such
economy some domestic players developed their own intellectual property and became
sufficiently powerful in the political system that they moved the system toward more
effective IP protection. The question is whether a similar process is unfolding in China
and whether it may take hold as Chinese producers move up the technology innovation
ladder with government encouragement and support.
There are clear indicators that China’s evolution is following the IP paths that
others have trod.
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, MANAGING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: HOW TO ACHIEVE CORPORATE
SUCCESS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 26–27 (2011).
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having an intellectual property strategy that seeks to steal other
intellectual property first before the country becomes developed enough
to offer strong protection and to demand the same from its weaker
trading partners.81 While a grand strategy—or, worse, a conspiracy
theory—may be attractive to those who are frustrated by the slow
progress China is making in enforcing intellectual property rights, that
theory assumes too much of a developing country’s ability—or, to be
more accurate, the human ability—to strike the appropriate balance in
the intellectual property system.82 It is not easy for countries to
determine ex ante when they have to cross over from the pirating side of
the intellectual property divide to the more promising side. Even in
hindsight, it is rather hard to determine when a once-pirating nation
such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, or Singapore transformed
into a country respectful of intellectual property rights.
If anything, the evolution of the Chinese patent system has
revealed the need for policymakers to take an incremental, pragmatic
approach toward establishing a well-functioning patent system. Such
development strongly resembles China’s developments in non–
intellectual property areas. The defining feature of the Chinese model—
or what some commentators have described as the “Beijing
Consensus”83 or, more modestly, the “Beijing Proposal”84—is not a
definitive formula of success. Rather, it is the Chinese leaders’
pragmatic approach in “groping for stones to cross the river”85 (mozhe
shitou guohe) and their willingness to consider a wide variety of
options.86 As Deng Xiaoping reminded Ghana President Jerry Rawlings
81 Cf. Berkow, supra note 74 (“China, experts argue, has intentionally maintained a lax
intellectual property enforcement regime for decades, waiting until its internal invention industry
had become strong enough to warrant something more robust.”).
82 Dan Breznitz made a similar observation in his testimony before the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission:

I’m not sure that China as a state has this grand strategy where they actually
understand everything that they’re doing because the failures of the central government
are unbelievable. But they have—(a) they have goals; (b) they have the will and the
power to go and do something about those goals. They have extremely capable
officials in the provincial and townships, which are doing everything in their power to
make this system work, sometimes against the wishes of the central government, and
we don’t have that much.
USCC Hearing, supra note 53, at 42.
83 See generally JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 4 (2004) (advancing the
concept of the Beijing Consensus); STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S
AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010) (discussing the
Beijing Consensus).
84 HU ANGANG, CHINA IN 2020: A NEW TYPE OF SUPERPOWER 17 (2011).
85 Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 69, at 1006.
86 See WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, ASIA, AMERICA, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
GEOPOLITICS 118 (2007) (“Chinese leaders . . . do not accept Western democratic ideology, but
they accept individual practices, such as village elections, because those practices have specific
pragmatic value in reducing corruption. They want to discover and test these things themselves,
step by step, rather than succumb to foreign ideological browbeating, but they are willing to
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in 1985: “Please don’t try to copy our model. If there is any experience
on our part, it is to formulate policies in light of one’s own national
conditions.”87 In the context of China’s increasing engagement in
Africa, Deborah Brautigam also observed:
At the end of the day, we should remember this: China’s own
experiments have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese out of
poverty, largely without foreign aid. They believe in investment,
trade, and technology as levers for development, and they are
applying these same tools in their African engagement, not out of
altruism but because of what they learned at home. . . . These lessons
emphasize not aid, but experiments; not paternalism, but the
“creative destruction” of competition and the green shoots of new
opportunities.88

In sum, while policymakers could certainly draw lessons and
insights from the slow, but active development of the Chinese patent
system, including the many “experiments” China conducted in the past
three decades to turn the system around, such development does not
provide a “grand strategy” or an easy prescription for other countries to
catch up in the patent world. In fact, China’s development was filled
with stories of trials and tribulations, of both successes and failures.
These failures, along with the country’s rapidly-changing socioeconomic conditions, were indeed why China had to completely revamp
its patent system three times since the system was introduced in 1984.89
To a large extent, China’s patent story is a story about “learning by
legislating”—a story familiar to most developing countries.
Until recently, the Chinese intellectual property model has been
rather unappealing, due in large part to the rampant piracy and
counterfeiting problems within the country. In recent years, however,
the country’s success in developing a world-class patent system has
invited developing countries to take a much-needed second look. To
some extent, the present discussion about the Chinese patent system has
raised the same question found in other recent debates concerning
China’s role in the international policy arena: Does Beijing now provide
an attractive alternative model for other developing countries that are
struggling in the present international economic system to catch up
consider nearly everything.” (emphasis added)).
87 JUSTIN YIFU LIN, THE QUEST FOR PROSPERITY: HOW DEVELOPING ECONOMIES CAN
TAKE OFF xvii (2012).
88 DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA
311–12 (2010); see also Sebastian Heilmann, Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise,
43 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 1 (2008) (discussing experimentation-based policymaking in China).
89 Since the introduction of a modern patent law in 1984, China undertook a major overhaul
of the patent system in 1992, 2000, and 2008. See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 47.
Although the system was revamped every eight years, “[t]hat each amendment should come every
eight years is a total coincidence.” Guo He, Patents, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
TECHNOLOGY LAWS 25, 29–30 (Rohan Kariyawasam ed., 2011).
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economically and technologically?90
IV. QUESTION 4: HAVE CHINESE SCHOOLS STARTED PLACING
MORE EMPHASIS ON CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION?
In view of the recent developments concerning the Chinese patent
system, one may begin to wonder what the major contributing factors
are. After all, developments concerning innovation strongly parallel
those concerning creativity. As Michael Keane observed in Created in
China in the mid-2000s:
While scarcely a defining concern for most Western researchers and
journalists, creativity has become a hot topic on the Mainland.
Concepts such as creative nation, creative city and creative century
are endorsed in policy statements within the 11th Five Year Plans of
many Chinese cities. How did “creativity” come to China so
suddenly? Why has it been embraced so enthusiastically?91

One question that I have often been asked in conferences or
presentations concerns whether Chinese schools have now started to
place more emphasis on creativity and innovation.92 This line of
questioning is understandable for two reasons. First, and obviously,
creativity and innovation go hand in hand with intellectual property
developments. If Chinese inventors, all of a sudden, have been able to
file many more patents, and if these filings were in fact not distorted by
domestic policy adjustments (as some critics of the Chinese patent
system have claimed),93 it is fair to assume that China has started to
provide either a more innovative environment or a much larger pool of
creative and engineering talents. Because education is instrumental to
cultivating such an environment or developing these needed talents,
schools provide a logical starting point for any inquiry concerning
China’s recent intellectual property developments.94
90 See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 69, at 1018–22 (exploring whether China
would present an alternative model of economic development for other developing countries); see
also RAMO, supra note 83, at 3 (“China is marking a path for other nations around the world who
are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the
international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life
and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity.”).
91 MICHAEL KEANE, CREATED IN CHINA: THE GREAT NEW LEAP FORWARD 2 (2007).
92 For example, my fellow panelists and I were asked this particular question at the
Conference on “China’s New Environment for Intellectual Property” at Fordham University
School of Law on April 11, 2012.
93 See discussion supra Part I.
94 Cf. Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign
Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 143 (1998)
(“[B]ecause labor skills are required for absorbing, using, and improving incoming
technology . . . , educational competence, particularly in technical and managerial areas, is
significant. Also important are professional support programs for technology transfer and
technology diffusion.” (footnote omitted)); Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 6, at 558–63 (noting

102

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

2013

Second, the Chinese educational system—or what some
commentators have derogatory described as “stuffed duck-style
education”95—has been widely criticized for its notorious emphasis on
rote learning and memorization and discouragement of creativity and
innovation.96 Indeed, commentators have identified China’s educational
and cultural environments as contributing factors to the country’s lack
of creativity or of respect for intellectual property rights.97 Some
commentators even blamed Confucianism, or the larger Chinese culture,
for the country’s massive piracy and counterfeiting problems.98 Thus, if
China has turned its patent system around, it might have found new
ways to encourage the development of a more creative and innovative
citizenry.
While the discussion of creativity and innovation in education is
very important, and rote learning remains a heavily criticized aspect of
the important role education plays in promoting global competitiveness).
95 E.g., JAMES MCGREGOR, ONE BILLION CUSTOMERS: LESSONS FROM THE FRONT LINES OF
DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 272 (2005).
96 See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 75, at 18–19 (discussing the need
for Chinese children in imperial China to memorize the Classics at a young age).
97 As Tom Doctoroff lamented, in a somewhat stereotypical fashion:
Regression to the mean is everywhere: cookie-cutter television series, indistinct Cantoand Mando-pop musical fare; newspapers and magazines saturated with bland
propaganda that neither provokes nor intrigues; rubber-stamped airport designs scarred,
from Xiamen to Chengdu, by identical low-end building materials; cheaply produced
household appliances sporting random bells and whistles; ubiquitous pirated mobile
phones; dozens of sneaker brands adorned with clunky variations of Nike’s swoosh; a
dynamic luxury scene that has never produced a Chinese label; undifferentiated,
bombastic advertising that dulls the senses; a brandscape that thrives on scaled
commoditization rather than differentiation.
China’s education system is partly to blame. Though meritocratic, it is stultifying,
ultraconformist, and all about learning by rote. Americans compose original essays on
“my summer vacation” or “my favorite book” almost as soon as they learn the
alphabet. Students here do not ask questions in class, let alone challenge the teacher. At
university, they are conditioned to “receive wisdom,” even in highly interpretive
majors such as literature or mass communications. Class participation counts for
nothing. When fresh graduates enter the workforce, their lips are sealed and their
bosses go unchallenged. New ideas are suppressed and professional development is
limited, leading to frustrated ambition and chronic job-hopping among young people.
DOCTOROFF, supra note 30, at 20–21. Likewise, Mark Liang noted:
Some observers go so far as to state that China’s culture discourages innovation, while
others note that China’s education system encourages rote learning to the detriment of
creative learning. And so the story goes that China has become brilliant at reproducing
what’s already been done, but is utterly incapable of coming up with the next big thing.
Liang, supra note 17, at 481; see also JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A
NEW HISTORY 101 (1998) (“Having memorized vast sequences of the classics and histories, they
constructed their own works by extensive cut-and-paste replication of phrases and passages from
those sources.”); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 75, at 18 (“When the
Chinese grew up, they were by training compilers, as compared to composers.”).
98 See generally Peter K. Yu, The Confucian Challenge to Intellectual Property Reforms, 4
WIPO J. 1 (2012) (critically evaluating the challenge Confucianism has posed to intellectual
property reforms in China and other parts of Asia).
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Chinese education,99 it is a non-starter to consider the Chinese
uncreative and uninnovative. It is indeed hard to imagine how an
uncreative and uninnovative people could come up with such pioneering
innovations as compass, gunpowder, papermaking, and woodblock
printing.100 In his seminal book series, Science and Civilisation in
China, Joseph Needham devoted his lifelong work to studying Chinese
scientific developments, including many inventions that still benefit the
world today.101 The important question China scholars ask is therefore
not why the Chinese could not come up with world-class inventions, but
why China had stopped doing so after a certain period of time?102
Put in the intellectual property context, that question becomes:
Why did China not offer stronger protection of intellectual property
rights despite having led the world in innovation? Raising that question
was indeed the approach taken by William Alford in his seminal work,
To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense.103 In the book’s opening
paragraph, he wrote: “Although scholars both East and West credit the
Chinese with having contributed paper, movable type, and ink to
humankind, China has yet to develop comprehensive protection for
what is created when one applies inked type to paper.”104
Even today, it is not hard to find traces of creativity and innovation
in products that most would condemn as infringing under international
intellectual property standards. Examples of these products included
unauthorized spinoffs of Harry Potter novels,105 funny copycat logos
such as “KFG,” “OMcMcDonald’s,” and “Pizza Huh,” and “shanzhai”
smartphones that improved on the original products.106 In all of these
99
100

See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 75, at 18–19.
For discussions of scientific developments in China, see generally BENJAMIN A. ELMAN,
ON THEIR OWN TERMS: SCIENCE IN CHINA, 1550–1900 (2005); JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND
CIVILISATION IN CHINA (1956–2004); ROBERT TEMPLE, THE GENIUS OF CHINA: 3,000 YEARS OF
SCIENCE, DISCOVERY, AND INVENTION (2007).
101 NEEDHAM, supra note 100.
102 See, e.g., DOCTOROFF, supra note 30, at 19 (noting that “[h]istorians debate the roots of
this stagnation”); MCGREGOR, supra note 53, at 10 (“China was once the center of global
innovation with such inventions as the compass, gunpowder, paper and printing. So why is the
country struggling to become innovative now?”).
103 WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995).
104 Id. at 1.
105 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 976–84 (discussing these
unauthorized spinoffs).
106 “Originally, shan zhai was used to refer to a bandit stronghold outside government control
[in imperial China]; today it is shorthand for a multitude of knockoffs, fakes, and pirated
products. These include everything from mobile phones to medicine and movies to makeup, and
they permeate China’s consumer markets.” EDWARD TSE, THE CHINA STRATEGY: HARNESSING
THE POWER OF THE WORLD’S FASTEST-GROWING ECONOMY 79 (2010). For discussions of the
shanzhai phenomenon in China, see generally YU HUA, CHINA IN TEN WORDS 181–202 (Allan
H. Barr trans., 2012); William Hennessey, Deconstructing Shanzhai—China’s Copycat
Counterculture: Catch Me If You Can, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609 (2012); Sun Haochen, Can
Louis Vuitton Dance with HiPhone? Rethinking the Idea of Social Justice in Intellectual Property
Law, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 387 (2012); Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values,
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examples of copycat products, what is problematic is not the lack of
creativity and innovation in these products. Rather, it is the violation of
intellectual property rights—or, in ethical terms, their engagement in
unfair business or trade practices.
Thus, a critical question that one should ask more frequently is: Do
the current international intellectual property standards provide
appropriate proxies for measuring creativity and innovation? In the
context of China’s recent developments in the patent area, it is also
worth exploring whether the type of creativity and innovation China
possesses is the same as the type enshrined in the current international
standards. Just because a product fails to satisfy the novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility requirements pursuant to the existing patent
standards does not necessarily mean that the product lacks any
creativity and innovativeness. It only means that the product does not
meet the strict threshold requirements set by these usually geopolitically
influenced standards.
In the past few years, commentators documented the emergence of
creative and innovative talents within China. For example, Michael
Keane identified such creative clusters as “Beijing’s 798 Factory,
Hangzhou’s Loft 49, Shanghai’s Tianzifang, and Chongqing’s Tank
Loft.”107 With regard to the semiconductor chip industry, Edward Luce
of the Financial Times also observed, “Terms such as ‘innovate in
China’ . . . are becoming commonplace at Intel and elsewhere.”108 In
fact, since the mid-1990s, Intel “has built five plants in China, all using
the latest technologies. To tap into China’s distinctive technological
developments, Intel Capital has invested in almost fifty companies in
China and in 2005 it set up a $200 million Intel Capital China
Technology Fund to take shares in promising technologies emerging
there.”109 Motorola and LG have also made similar investments,
building research and development (R&D) centers in China.110
supra note 23, at 390.
107 KEANE, supra note 91, at 3.
108 EDWARD LUCE, TIME TO START THINKING: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF DESCENT 158
(2012).
109 ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR: HOW CHINESE COST
INNOVATION IS DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION 181 (2007).
110 As Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson recounted:
[Since 1993], Motorola has built sixteen R&D centers with more than eighteen
hundred people. In 1999, Motorola set up its China Research Institute in Beijing, which
is among the largest facilities of its type in China, and also a world-class center within
Motorola. Between 985 and 2003, Motorola has applied for 2,305 patents, making it
among the biggest patent applicants in China. . . .
Recognizing that it needs to leverage Chinese advantages at every stage of the
value chain in order to strengthen its global competitiveness, Korea’s LG group has
gone even further, moving key R&D to China. In 2005 LG hired two thousand
engineers and scientists into its Chinese R&D center, making it LG’s largest R&D site
outside Korea. LG has submitted more worldwide patent applications based on
research conducted in China than any other company, with the exception for Huawei.
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In addition, a growing number of commentators have started to
appreciate the different forms of innovation that are slowly emerging in
China. For instance, Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson discussed what
they called “cost innovation.”111 As they observed:
The new competition from China is . . . disruptive because it
threatens to obsolete much of the established firms’ assets,
capabilities, and experience base by changing the accepted rules of
the game, undermining traditional profit models, and growing parts
of the market that incumbents are poorly equipped to serve.112

By contrast, Tan Yinglan focused on “process innovation.”113 As he
explained:
Most of China’s companies are in the stage of process innovation.
Start-ups typically learn and adopt business models from other
geographies and adapt them locally. Companies are trying to move
into technological innovation via research and development by
building on their existing knowledge, the way semiconductor firms
are moving into thin film in 2010. Most Chinese firms are still using
existing technology to create products, rather than creating the
technology itself (as is done in the United States).114

Going further than Tan, Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree pointed
out that “China’s innovation capabilities are not solely in process (or
incremental) innovation but also in the organization of production,
manufacturing techniques and technologies, delivery, design, and
second-generation innovation.”115
The emergence of this literature is important. Such literature not
only helps us better understand how the Chinese patent system will be
developed in the near future, but also raises the important, and
somewhat sensitive, question about whether China’s emergence as a
patent power would harm the interests of other major developed
countries, including most notably the United States. In Run of the Red
Queen, for example, Breznitz and Murphree reminded us that the
Chinese model could complement the breakthrough innovation
embraced by the United States and other developed countries.116 Using
By placing such emphasis on China-based R&D, LG is tapping into the secrets of how
to deliver high technology at low cost to strengthen and differentiate its completive
position against rivals such as Sony, Matsushita, and its archrival Samsung.
Id. at 178.
111 See generally ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 109.
112 Id. at 55–56.
113 TAN YINGLAN, CHINNOVATION: HOW CHINESE INNOVATORS ARE CHANGING THE
WORLD xii (2011).
114 Id. at 268.
115 DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN: GOVERNMENT,
INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 4 (2011).
116 See id. at 206 (“[T]hanks to the fragmentation of production, the rise of China need not be
seen as a zero-sum game by policy makers inside and outside the country.”).

106

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

2013

Apple iPod and iPhone as examples, the authors observed:
China needed Apple to develop the concept and definition of the
iPod and the iPhone, but Apple cannot produce and sell these
products without China. In the world of flexible mass production, the
Red Queen country [referring to China or other countries with a
similar innovation model] needs the novel-product innovators to
keep churning out new ideas, and the novel-product-innovating
countries need the Red Queen country to keep innovating on almost
every aspect of production and delivery.117

Likewise, Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson wrote: “Far from being a
zero-sum game . . . , the emergence of Chinese companies as significant
players in the global market promises new benefits to the world’s
consumers and new opportunities to those established companies that
choose the right responses and execute them well.”118 Tan Yinglan
further noted that the use by most Chinese firms of “existing technology
to create products, rather than creating the technology itself[,] . . . makes
China tech markets symbiotic and complementary with the U.S. market
and those in some other countries.”119
In sum, if the type of innovation found in China is indeed
somewhat different from the type commonly found in the United States
or other parts of the world, one has to wonder whether it is
oversimplified to inquire whether Chinese schools are now beginning to
place more emphasis on creativity and innovation. While this line of
questioning certainly ties well to an intellectual property–irrelevant
debate about political freedom and democracy, it informs less about
China’s future as a patent power. After all, there are different types of
creativity and innovation.120 If we want to know more about whether
schools have placed more emphasis on creativity and innovation, we
117
118
119
120

Id. at 18.
ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 109, at vii.
TAN, supra note 113, at 268.
See NINA HACHIGIAN & MONA SUTPHEN, THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY: HOW THE U.S.
CAN THRIVE AS OTHER POWERS RISE 117 (2010) (“Innovation can take many forms—new
products (Post-it notes or diabetes drugs), production methods (just-in-time manufacturing), ways
of doing business (big-box retailing), or even new industries (genomics). Innovation can also
come from mundane improvements in the way a company does business. Small changes can
beget great efficiencies, high productivity growth, and, ultimately, economic growth.”); Keith
Pavitt, Innovation Processes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 86, 87 (Jan
Fagerberg, David C. Mowery & Richard R. Nelson eds., 2006) (“Innovation processes differ in
many respects according to the economic sector, field of knowledge, type of innovation, historical
period and country concerned. They also vary with the size of the firm, its corporate strategy or
strategies, and its prior experience with innovation.”); see also HENRY KISSINGER, NIALL
FERGUSON, DAVID DAOKUI LI & FAREED ZAKARIA, DOES THE 21ST CENTURY BELONG TO
CHINA?: THE MUNK DEBATE ON CHINA 37 (Rudyard Griffiths & Patrick Luciani eds., 2011)
(“With the invention of the sewing machine, Singer’s great skill was not coming up with the best
machine. It was that he figured out that he could sell it to women on an instalment plan.” (quoting
Fareed Zakaria, editor-at-large of Time)). See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INNOVATION, supra, at 349–484 (collecting essays discussing variations in innovation processes).
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also need to develop a better appreciation of the different types of
creativity and innovation found across the world. Which type are we
talking about: pathbreaking or breakthrough innovation or sequential or
cumulative innovation?121 “First-to-world innovation,”122 “business
model innovation,” or “innovations in supply chain management”?123
V. QUESTION 5: WILL THE PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IMPROVE IN CHINA
IN THE NEAR FUTURE?
The recent significant increase in the number of patents applied for
and granted in China may lead one to wonder whether the intellectual
property landscape in China has undergone or will undergo a tectonic
shift. Drawing on the history of intellectual property developments in
Germany, the United States, Japan, and many other once-developing
countries, one may also question whether China has finally reached that
proverbial “crossover point”—the point where a country crosses over
from a pirating nation to a nation respectful of intellectual property
rights.124 After all, the picture concerning China’s recent developments
in the patent area is certainly different from the clichéd picture of pirates
and counterfeiters policymakers, industries, commentators, and the
media have painted painstakingly for more than a decade.
To be certain, the improvements found in China in the patent area
are not isolated. One could also find similar developments in the
trademark area. In a previous work, I noted how trademark protection
fits well with the socio-political environment in China.125 For example,
121 See Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, supra note 23, at 389 & n.253 (noting the
different approaches toward pathbreaking or breakthrough innovations and sequential or
cumulative innovations); see also KEANE, supra note 91, at 152 (“The individual approach
privileges basic research, discovery, breakthroughs and great insights. The rewards are Oscars,
patents, international bestsellers and Nobel Prizes.”).
122 USCC Hearing, supra note 53, at 10 (reproducing the statement of Robert D. Atkinson,
President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation).
123 Id. at 65 (reproducing the prepared statement of Richard P. Suttmeier, Professor of Political
Science, Emeritus, University of Oregon); see also Jan Fagerberg, Innovation: A Guide to the
Literature, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 120, at 1, 8 (“Introducing
something in a new context often implies considerable adaptation (and, hence, incremental
innovation) and, as history has shown, organizational changes (or innovations) that may
significantly increase productivity and competiveness.” (citation omitted)).
124 See Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 73, at 10–15 (discussing the
existence of a “crossover point” where countries consider it to be in their self-interest to move
from a pirating nation to one that strongly respects intellectual property rights); see also Richard
P. Suttmeier & Yao Xiangkui, China’s IP Transition: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights in a
Rising China 6–7 (National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report No. 29, 2011)
(“China is . . . poised for an IP transition. Yet whether this transition will lead to greater
harmonization with international IP norms and practices, toward ‘destroying the IP regime’ . . . ,
or to some other departure from the given order remains unclear.”).
125 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 995–98.
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when compared with copyrights or patents, trademarks will create fewer
obstacles to China’s modernization efforts. As Peter Feng rightly
observed, trademarks “were a state planning tool before they became a
marketing device and private property.”126 By contrast, copyright
protection could negatively impact a country’s ability to maintain
cultural and media control and its extensive propaganda efforts.127
Patent protection could also slow down a country’s efforts by draining
foreign exchange reserves in the form of royalty and license fee
payments.
It is therefore no surprise that the 1982 Trademark Law was the
first intellectual property law to be enacted after China reopened its
market to foreign trade in the late 1970s. (For comparison purposes, the
Patent Law was not introduced until two years later, and the Copyright
Law was adopted in 1990 following significant pressure from the
USTR.128) It is also worth noting that trademark registrations continued
even during the Cultural Revolution, despite growing politicization of
trademarks and the growing use among manufacturers of “politically
correct” pseudonyms and non-identifying labels (such as “Red Flag”
(hongqi), “East Wind” (dongfeng), and “Worker-Peasant-Soldier” (gong
nong bing)).129 In fact, had China not actively pushed for the
development of the patent system through the State Council’s National
Intellectual Property Strategy and SIPO’s National Patent Development
Strategy, one may wonder whether trademark protection would have a
much brighter future in China than both copyright and patent
protections. With the adoption of these strategies, however, it is likely
that the future of both trademark and patent protection will be much
brighter than that of copyright protection.
If the compatibility between trademark protection and China’s
socio-political environment is not significant enough, the development
of the Chinese trademark system has benefited significantly from the
government’s active push for the development of national champions
and their well-known brands.130 The development of the trademark
system also goes hand in hand with the rapid emergence of the Chinese
middle class, whose disposable income and purchasing power have
126
127

FENG, supra note 24, at 344.
See ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 133–34, 140 (2005); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra
note 75, at 28–32.
128 See Zhang Naigen, Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New
Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 8 (1997).
129 See FENG, supra note 24, at 293; MERTHA, supra note 127, at 197; Mark Sidel, Copyright,
Trademark and Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 272
(1986).
130 See NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 43, ¶ 7 (including as a
strategic goal that “[a] number of world-famous brands will emerge”); see also Yu, From Pirates
to Partners II, supra note 1, at 998 (pointing out that brand building fits with the government’s
strategy of consolidating industries to create national champions).
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helped facilitate the development of a fast-growing luxury market. As
early as 2005, Ernst & Young made the following forecast:
The Chinese luxury market . . . is expected to grow 20%, annually
until 2008 and then 10% annually until 2015, when sales are
expected to exceed US$ 11.5 billion. By 2010, China is expected to
have a quarter-billion consumers who can afford luxury products,
nearly 17 times the present number. By 2015, Chinese consumers
could be as influential as the Japanese and account for 29% of all
global luxury goods purchases.131

Although this forecast was already quite impressive a few years ago, a
new forecast showed that the Chinese middle class and luxury goods
market had grown even more rapidly than many anticipated.132 As Bain
& Company estimated in December 2011:
Luxury goods purchases in China and by Chinese consumers reached
a total of 212 B RMB [over US$30 billion] in 2010. Luxury
purchases grew by 27 percent in Mainland China in 2010 and by 45
percent in Hong Kong and Macau, while Chinese luxury purchases
abroad grew by 38 percent. When including Hong Kong and Macau
spending, Greater China becomes the world’s third largest luxury
market, bypassing Italy and amounting to nearly 40% of the US
luxury market.133

In sum, intellectual property protection and enforcement is likely
to greatly improve in both the patent and trademark areas. The same,
however, may not be said of the copyright area. A major barrier to
active development in this area is the continuously heavy control of
content and information flows in both the offline and online worlds. In
the audiovisual sector, for example, China continues to face significant
content control.134 Such tight control eventually led the United States to
file a WTO complaint concerning China’s denial of trading rights and
market access for distribution services for publications, sound
recordings, and audiovisual entertainment products.135 Despite an
aggressive defense by China and a subsequent appeal, both the WTO
panel and the Appellate Body found for the United States on most

131
132

ERNST & YOUNG, CHINA: THE NEW LAP OF LUXURY 1 (2005).
BAIN & CO., 2011 China Luxury Market Study, http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/
2011-china-luxury-market-study.aspx (Dec. 15, 2011).
133 Id.
134 For discussions of censorship in Chinese cinema and the country’s importation quota for
foreign movies, see generally Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239 (1999); Carl Erik Heiberg, Note, American Films in China: An Analysis
of China’s Intellectual Property Record and Reconsideration of Cultural Trade Exceptions
Amidst Rampant Piracy, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 219 (2006).
135 Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,
WT/DS363/1 (Apr. 16, 2007).
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counts.136
Compared with the offline world, content control in the online
environment in China is even more severe. Despite widely reported
censorship in Russia, the Middle East, North Africa, and other parts of
the world, China remains the poster child of internet censorship.137
From time to time, mainstream media report the tightened censorship of
internet-based media. Only a few months ago, mainstream media widely
reported the new regulations the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress adopted to require the use of real identities in
registering accounts with internet service providers.138 Although those
regulations could promote the protection of personal data, critics feared
that the new requirements would result in tighter control over the use of
blogs and other internet-based social media.139
In China in 2020, noted Chinese economist Hu Angang described
five capacities and indicators that can be used to evaluate a country’s
science and technology power.140 The first, second, and fifth capacities
are directly related to the development of the patent system—namely,
“the country’s innovative capacity in science” (measured by
publications in internationally recognized science and technology
journals), “innovative capacity as regards technology” (measured by
domestic patent applications), and “the capacity of a country to invest in
R&D” (measured by research and development expenditures).141 The
third capacity, “the country’s ability to use new technologies”
(measured by the number of computer users), relates to not only the
patent system, but also other intellectual property systems, most notably
copyright.142
Although all four of these capacities are pretty straightforward and
uncontroversial, the fourth capacity, “the capacity of a country to use
136 See Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009);
Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21,
2009). This outcome stands in sharp contrast to the more favorable outcome of the U.S.-China
intellectual property enforcement dispute. Although the United States filed the intellectual
property complaint on the same day as the complaint on trading and distribution rights, the panel
report on the intellectual property dispute was evenly split between China and the United States.
See WTO Panel Report, supra note 4; see also Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note
4; Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, supra note 4.
137 See, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Internet Freedom, Address
Delivered at the Newseum in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/21/internet_freedom?page=full.
138 See Keith Bradsher, In Latest Crackdown, China Toughens Rules on Internet Users, Dec.
29, 2012, N.Y. TIMES, at A4.
139 See id.
140 HU, supra note 84, at 96–99.
141 Id. at 98. See generally DENIS FRED SIMON & CAO CONG, CHINA’S EMERGING
TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF HIGH-END TALENT (2009) (discussing China’s
rapid development of technological capacity in recent years).
142 HU, supra note 84, at 98.
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global information,” raises some challenging questions.143 In Professor
Hu’s view, that capacity is “measured by calculating the number of
people that access the Internet.”144 Because China now possesses the
world’s largest internet population of more than 564 million,145 it likely
possesses the needed capacity. On close scrutiny, however, a country
cannot have full capacity to use global information unless access to the
internet would result in meaningful access to the needed global
information.146 Given the widespread control of internet content, one
could question how successfully China meets this capacity.
In sum, while China may experience very promising developments
in the patent and trademark areas, its developments in the copyright area
may lag significantly behind. Whether the protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights will improve will depend ultimately on
whether one focuses on the first two areas or the last one. The
impressive developments we see in the patent area likely will not
translate well to similar progress in the copyright area.
To complicate matters even further, the significant variations in
these areas could raise an interesting question about what future foreign
intellectual property policy the United States should adopt toward
China. After all, a widening divide between patent and trademark
protection on the one hand and copyright protection on the other could
easily translate to a similar gap in the U.S.-China intellectual property
debate—a gap between those U.S. industries driven by copyright
protection (such as the movie and music industries) and those driven by
patent and trademark protection (such as the pharmaceutical and luxury
goods industries).147
This widening gap is important, because external pressure—
usually from the USTR—has been a major catalyst to China’s
intellectual property reforms. Such pressure comes in handy when
reformist leaders need an outside push to help reduce resistance from
their conservative counterparts.148 Thus, if the U.S.-China intellectual
property debate is bifurcated along the lines of copyright versus patent
and trademark, such bifurcation could result in significant variations in
143
144
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146 Cf. Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 13–14 (2002) (arguing that the term “digital divide” should be
broadly defined to cover digital content and noting that “[w]ithout access to such content, . . .
users would still be shut out of the digital revolution even if they have access to the Internet and
new communications technologies”).
147 Such a gap exists in other intellectual property debates. See Yu, ACTA and Its Complex
Politics, supra note 69, at 13–15 (discussing the complex domestic politics implicated by the
ACTA negotiations).
148 See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 440 (2003).
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the external pressure exerted on China in different areas of intellectual
property law.149 These variations in turn would create further variations
in the improvements in each area.
Finally, while the divide between patent and trademark protection
on the one hand and copyright protection on the other is significant, it is
worth keeping in mind that China also struggles with wide regional,
sectoral, and technological disparities.150 Indeed, these disparities are so
significant that I have described China as “a country of countries.”151 As
I surmised in an earlier article:
Under this scenario, stronger intellectual property protection will
appear in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other major cities and
coastal regions. Meanwhile, the massive piracy and counterfeiting
problems will stay in China, migrating from the country’s developed
parts to its less developed parts. To strike a compromise between the
different regional needs, interests, and development goals, Chinese
leaders may take some rather “schizophrenic,” or pragmatic,
positions in designing their intellectual property policies. The
resulting regional conflicts and rivalries may also become major
factors affecting the future development of intellectual property
protection in China.152

Given these disparities, and the much slower development of the
Chinese copyright system, China is unlikely to simultaneously
experience dramatic improvements in the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights in all the major areas of intellectual property
rights. Instead, the country’s improvements will vary according to time,
region, sector, and the type of intellectual property right. If China is to
cross over from a pirating nation to a nation respectful of intellectual
property rights, it may experience several crossover points—depending
on time, region, sector, and the type of intellectual property right.153
Until China as a whole crosses over from the pirating side of the
intellectual property divide to the more promising side, it likely will
have to continue to make policy compromises that often result in
“schizophrenic” positions in the international intellectual property

149 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 1, at 138–40 (discussing the USTR’s
Section 301 process).
150 See Yu, Regime Complex, supra note 71, at 21–32.
151 Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 963; see also SHENKAR, supra note 30, at
134 (pointing out that “China’s enormous labor reserve, with pay scales radically lower in the
hinterland than on the coast and in urban areas . . . , creates the equivalent of a country within a
country”).
152 Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellectual
Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L. 412, 423 (2008).
153 See Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 73, at 13–14 (“Because of their
complex economic situations, these countries may also have more than one crossover point,
depending on whether one focuses on a specific geographical region or the relevant economic
sector.”).
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arena.154 It will indeed be no surprise if China is aligned with the
developing world with respect to certain issues, but with the developed
world with respect to others.
CONCLUSION
Looking back, it is hard not to be amazed by the turnaround China
experienced in the intellectual property arena in the past few years.
Although the country did not have a modern patent system until 1984, it
is now on track to become the world’s leader in both domestic and
international patent applications. Taking account of these developments,
it is not hard to reject as overly simplistic and outdated the picture of
massive piracy and counterfeiting in China usually painted by
policymakers, industries, commentators, and the media. It is also not
difficult to deem as unwise the industries’ continued push for greater
enforcement, regardless of whether such enforcement could eventually
backfire on these industries while benefiting their competitors—Chinese
industries and rights holders.155
Nonetheless, it is much harder to determine how the future of
intellectual property protection and enforcement in China will hold. It is
equally hard to determine whether the promising developments in the
patent area, and to some extent the trademark area, would be extended
to the copyright area. To help us better understand this future, this
Article recalls five key questions that I have been repeatedly asked in
presentations or conferences exploring recent intellectual property
developments in China. While the answers reflect neither a rosy picture
of China’s “great leap forward” in the intellectual property arena nor a
continuously gloomy picture of pirates and counterfeiters, the picture is
complex, dualistic, and highly dynamic. It includes both yin and yang.
In the future, China is likely to see both the yin of continued
massive piracy and counterfeiting and the yang of China’s rise as an
intellectual property power at the same time. Although internal
contradictions are not uncommon in China,156 especially when one takes
into account the country’s uneven regional, sectoral, and technological
developments, this complex, dualistic, and highly dynamic picture
suggests the possibility for a new phenomenon that the world has never
154 See Yu, Regime Complex, supra note 71, at 25–26 (explaining why intellectual property
developments in China should not be analyzed as if the country were homogeneous).
155 See Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 6, at 543–56 (discussing the unintended
consequences of the industries’ increasing push for greater intellectual property enforcement
without taking into consideration China’s rise as an intellectual property power).
156 See John J. Hamre & C. Fred. Bergsten, Preface to C. FRED BERGSTEN, BATES GILL,
NICHOLAS R. LARDY & DEREK J. MITCHELL, CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD
NEEDS TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER ix (2006) (noting that China is
“sometimes internally contradictory”).
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seen before. Its unprecedented nature certainly suggests our present
need to better understand the recent intellectual property developments
in China and to engage in a deeper assessment of the implications of
these developments.

